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Abstract
Regarding image forensics, researchers have proposed
various approaches to detect and/or localize manipulations,
such as splices. Recent best performing image-forensics al-
gorithms greatly benefit from the application of deep learn-
ing, but such tools can be vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Due to the fact that most of the proposed adversarial exam-
ple generation techniques can be used only on end-to-end
classifiers, the adversarial robustness of image-forensics
methods that utilize deep learning only for feature extrac-
tion has not been studied yet. Using a novel algorithm ca-
pable of directly adjusting the underlying representations
of patches we demonstrate on three non end-to-end deep
learning-based splice localization tools that hiding manip-
ulations of images is feasible via adversarial attacks. While
the tested image-forensics methods, EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar,
and Noiseprint, rely on feature extractors that were trained
on different surrogate tasks, we find that the formed ad-
versarial perturbations can be transferable among them re-
garding the deterioration of their localization performance.
1. Introduction
There is an increasing demand for tools capable of de-
tecting manipulated digital media, including fake pictures.
Researchers proposed various approaches to detect and/or
localize image manipulations. While detection only pro-
vides a verdict on the authenticity of the picture in ques-
tion, localization shows the tampered pixels of the manip-
ulated image and, therefore, gives us a better insight about
the nature and goal of the modification. Recent advances
in image forensics are, at least, partially due to the appli-
cation of machine learning as some of the best perform-
ing splice localization systems are deep learning-based ap-
proaches [1, 15, 11, 7, 28, 24, 26].
Although the utilization of deep learning yields improve-
ments in image forensics, deep learning models can be ma-
nipulated. Szegedy et al. [25] demonstrated that machine
Figure 1: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE GENERATION. Adver-
sarial attacks on networks performing recognition tasks, as shown
on the left, are simple as there is one loss function that combines
the scores from the classes and it can be back-propagated to the in-
put image. Splice localization tools, displayed on the right, break
their input image into 100s or 1000s of patches that often over-
lap. Then a feature representation is extracted for each patch, from
which group statistics identify discrepancies yielding the localiza-
tion of manipulated regions. In such systems there is no single loss
function to target and there is also no differential path backwards
through the statistical processes. This paper develops an alterna-
tive attack by directly manipulating the patch representations.
learning models, including the state-of-the-art deep neural
networks, can misclassify slightly perturbed, otherwise cor-
rectly classified inputs. The existence of such adversarial
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examples raises fundamental questions about the general-
ization properties and the real-world applications of ma-
chine learning models.
Researchers developed various counter-forensics tools to
impede traditional multimedia-forensics methods – Barni et
al. [3] provides a detailed overview on the subject area –
but the adversarial robustness of the latest deep learning-
based manipulation localization approaches has not been
analyzed yet. While the latest image-forensics methods uti-
lize deep learning models for extracting feature representa-
tions to localize manipulations, most adversarial attacks are
capable of forming adversarial perturbations only on end-
to-end recognition systems [25, 12, 17, 4, 19, 18, 8]. Con-
sequently, as visually demonstrated in Figure 1, such ap-
proaches are not suitable for performing adversarial attacks
on non end-to-end systems.
In this paper, we show that non end-to-end deep learning-
based splice localization tools can be manipulated via ad-
versarial attacks. We perform experiments on three of the
best performing tools that are available, EXIF-SC [15],
SpliceRadar [11], and Noiseprint [7]. Our experiments
on three datasets demonstrate that the splice localization
performance of the targeted deep learning-based image-
forensics tools can significantly deteriorate due to our novel
adversarial attack. Namely, by imperceptibly and simulta-
neously perturbing each image patch, we can hide manipu-
lations of spliced images from the targeted image-forensics
methods. We find that adversarial perturbations between
the three image-forensics tools can be transferable, with
different effectiveness. For instance, the adversarial exam-
ples generated on EXIF-SC tend to greatly decrease the lo-
calization performance of SpliceRadar. Interestingly, this
transferability appears to be asymmetric as it does not oc-
cur in the other direction. Overall, our experimental results
suggest that Noiseprint is the most robust among the three
tested image-forensics tools.
2. Related Work
Many image-forensics techniques, especially manipula-
tion detection and localization approaches, rely on artifacts
that are introduced by the image formation pipeline. The
idea is that manipulations, although they may not leave any
visual clues, alter such underlying artifacts of images [20].
EXIF-SC proposed by Huh et al. [15] utilizes EXIF
metadata for manipulation detection and localization.
Given a pair of image patches, a Siamese network has been
trained to predict the probability that patches share the same
value for each of the 83 EXIF metadata attributes. Each
branch of the network produces a 4096-dimensional fea-
ture vector which represents the EXIF metadata information
of the particular patch. Following that, a two-layer Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP) is applied to combine the EXIF
metadata consistency predictions to an overall consistency.
Finally, mean shift [5] is used for finding the most consistent
mode among all consistency maps of the selected patches.
SpliceRadar of Ghosh et al. [11] relies on low-level im-
age statistics related to camera models and disregards high-
level features connected to semantics. The feature extractor
has been trained via a surrogate task of camera model iden-
tification. After an image patch is fed into a learned and
constrained convolutional layer mimicking the filters pro-
posed in [10], mutual information computed between the
patch and its corresponding intermediate feature represen-
tation is used as a penalty to further suppress semantics.
During inference, a 100-dimensional feature representation
is obtained for each image patch. Similar to [6], a Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM) with two components is applied to
localize genuine and forged regions of the particular image
based upon the feature representation of the patches.
Noiseprint proposed by Cozzolino et al. [7] extracts
noise residuals – called noiseprints – from images and uti-
lizes those patterns as camera model fingerprints. Based on
a convolutional image denoiser proposed in [27], the au-
thors train a Siamese network to classify whether a pair of
patches originate from the same camera model and loca-
tion. Each branch of the network yields a 2-D feature map
which represents the camera noise residuals. A distance-
based logistic loss is applied during training to ensure small
distances between noiseprints that belong to same camera
model/location and large distances otherwise. During infer-
ence, noiseprint is extracted via the trained image denoiser
for the particular image. With the assumption that genuine
and forged patches originate from different camera models
and, therefore, yield discrepancies on noise residuals of the
corresponding patches, Noiseprint, similar to [6], utilizes a
GMM to separate genuine and manipulated regions.
The feasibility and effectiveness of adversarial attacks
as counter-forensics on non end-to-end deep learning-based
manipulation localization approaches, such as EXIF-SC,
SpliceRadar, or Noiseprint, have not been analyzed yet.
Gu¨era et al. [13] showed that an end-to-end Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN), which was trained to identify the
camera source of images, can be spoofed via adversarial at-
tacks, such as the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method [12]
or the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [19].
Barni et al. [2] assessed the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples formed via the iterative FGS [17] and JSMA meth-
ods using two CNN architectures that were trained to de-
tect image resizing and median filtering, respectively. Note
that the two previously mentioned related works experiment
with adversarial attacks on end-to-end networks. Also,
those image-forensics algorithms perform manipulation de-
tection rather than localization.
To perform adversarial attacks on EXIF-SC, SpliceR-
adar, or Noiseprint, adversaries need to directly manipulate
the internal feature representations these image-forensics
methods rely on. The approach of Sabour et al. [23] yields
adversarial examples that cause misclassifications and also
mimic the internal representations of targeted inputs. They
use the computationally expensive L-BFGS optimization
technique, which limits the application of their technique.
The Layerwise Origin-Target Synthesis (LOTS) of Rozsa
et al. [21, 22] is similar as it is also capable of directly
manipulating internal representations, but it is computation-
ally more efficient. Inkawhich et al. [16] used an approach
very similar to LOTS to show its effectiveness of forming
transferable adversarial examples between end-to-end deep
learning-based recognition systems. To experiment with the
targeted image-forensics methods, we adapt LOTS to simul-
taneously manipulate the feature representations of overlap-
ping patches representing the spliced images.
3. Approach
While the targeted image-forensics algorithms solve the
same localization task on manipulated images very dif-
ferently, from a bird’s-eye view, their architectures show
some similarities. Namely, they extract feature representa-
tions from patches and utilize those for splice localization.
While SpliceRadar and Noiseprint simply perform cluster-
ing based upon the extracted feature representations using
a two-component Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), EXIF-
SC derives consistency maps for each patch using their fea-
ture representations and combines those to identify discrep-
ancies. Consequently, if an adversary is able to modify
pixels of patches and make feature representations of those
similar, these image-forensics tools will fail to differentiate
authentic and manipulated regions.
To be able to perform adversarial attacks on the targeted
image-forensics methods, we adapt LOTS [21, 22] to simul-
taneously manipulate the feature representations of image
patches that these splice localization tools rely on. Consid-
ering a manipulated image X and its corresponding set of
patches P , we start with identifying authentic patches, de-
noted as A, from P . We define a patch authentic if and only
if each of its pixels are authentic. Next, we specify the tar-
get representation t to be the mean feature representation of
authentic patches. Our goal is to make both authentic and
manipulated patches mimic t with their feature representa-
tions. To do so, for each patch we utilize a Euclidean loss
defined on its feature representation f (Pi) and the target
representation t, and apply its gradient with respect to the
pixels of patch Pi to move its feature representation closer
to t. These patch-gradients can be defined as
ηi(Pi, t) = ∇Pi
(
1
2
‖t− f(Pi)‖2
)
, i = 0, ..., L , (1)
where L is the number of patches for image X . Note that
patches (P ) and feature representations of patches (f (Pi))
are obtained as defined by the targeted image-forensics tool.
The targeted image-forensics methods can rely on mul-
tiple, sometimes overlapping, patches to localize manipu-
lated regions of images. Therefore, we simply combine
the calculated patch-gradients ηi(Pi, t) according to their
corresponding locations on the particular image X to ob-
tain G (P, t). Note that G has the same dimensions as X .
We calculate and apply the combined gradients iteratively.
Therefore, our algorithm can be formalized as
X0 = X, Xn+1 = Xn − α
G
(
P (n), t
)∥∥G (P (n), t)∥∥∞ , (2)
where P (n) refers to the patches of Xn, and α defines the
step-size. After applying the scaled and combined gradients
toXn, we clip pixels to be in the range of [0, 255]. Note that
the number of patches and their locations remain the same,
while pixel-values for P (n) can vary between iterations.
In our experiments, we run this algorithm for a prede-
fined number of iterations with a fixed step-size α, and
choose the perturbed image Xn with patches having the
smallest average distance from target t. After identifying
the best, we round pixel-values and save the resulting per-
turbed image.
4. Experiments
In this section, after describing the experimental setup,
we present the results of our adversarial attacks on three non
end-to-end deep learning-based image-forensics methods.
4.1. Experimental setup
To help reproducability and future comparisons, we aim
at revealing all details about our experiments and justifying
various decisions we made for the experimental setup.
Targeted image-forensics algorithms. Due to the na-
ture of white-box attacks, our selection is limited to ap-
proaches with available source code. Consequently, we
choose EXIF-SC [15], SpliceRadar [11], and Noiseprint
[7]. As the Columbia dataset contains smaller images
than DSO-1, we slightly adjust SpliceRadar for the former
dataset by changing the stride of patches from 48 to 24 pix-
els. This modification allows SpliceRadar to perform bet-
ter due to the increased number of patches via the smaller
stride. Regarding the adapted LOTS, while attacking EXIF-
SC and SpliceRadar, we aim at mimicking the mean feature
representations of authentic patches with the 4096- and 100-
dimensional feature vectors of patches, respectively. The
patch sizes and their locations are identical to those used
for inference. For Noiseprint – based on preliminary exper-
iments – we utilize 8×8 pixel, non-overlapping patches for
both defining the target as the mean feature representation
of authentic patches and then moving feature representa-
tions of all patches closer to the specified target. Other than
LOCALIZATION METHOD COLUMBIA DSO-1 NC16
(results on spliced images) F1 MCC AUC MAP F1 MCC AUC MAP F1 MCC AUC MAP
B
L
EXIF-SC 0.911 0.878 0.980 0.952 0.568 0.517 0.845 0.526 0.377 0.359 0.796 0.340
SpliceRadar 0.785 0.698 0.877 0.758 0.690 0.656 0.912 0.657 0.399 0.382 0.813 0.349
Noiseprint 0.816 0.736 0.905 0.817 0.800 0.782 0.928 0.775 0.415 0.404 0.781 0.352
W
B
A EXIF-SC 0.696 0.553 0.812 0.688 0.350 0.249 0.691 0.266 0.327 0.308 0.769 0.281
SpliceRadar 0.583 0.365 0.691 0.498 0.362 0.274 0.687 0.273 0.305 0.289 0.756 0.246
Noiseprint 0.748 0.636 0.859 0.769 0.573 0.515 0.812 0.506 0.332 0.311 0.730 0.273
T
R
A
EXIF-SC on SpliceRadar Ex. 0.896 0.860 0.973 0.937 0.557 0.507 0.845 0.516 0.378 0.360 0.795 0.341
EXIF-SC on Noiseprint Ex. 0.887 0.849 0.970 0.933 0.556 0.502 0.840 0.513 0.375 0.360 0.797 0.338
SpliceRadar on EXIF-SC Ex. 0.583 0.364 0.692 0.498 0.569 0.524 0.859 0.515 0.344 0.330 0.786 0.291
SpliceRadar on Noiseprint Ex. 0.719 0.587 0.825 0.681 0.676 0.640 0.903 0.637 0.389 0.367 0.807 0.332
Noiseprint on EXIF-SC Ex. 0.729 0.610 0.855 0.746 0.679 0.638 0.876 0.648 0.321 0.301 0.747 0.264
Noiseprint on SpliceRadar Ex. 0.702 0.564 0.818 0.670 0.735 0.704 0.911 0.720 0.355 0.335 0.763 0.304
All Authentic Attack 0.570 0.276 N/A N/A 0.279 0.136 N/A N/A 0.174 0.125 N/A N/A
Table 1: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS. This table shows performance measures for EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint on the ma-
nipulated images of the Columbia, DSO-1, and NC16 datasets, respectively. We show the baseline performances (BL) and how the
manipulation localization performances of the targeted image-forensics methods change due to adversarial white-box attacks (WBA) and
the transferability (TRA) of the formed adversarial perturbations. The last row (All Authentic Attack) presents the applicable measures for
ideal attacks where each pixel is declared authentic by the targeted image-forensics tool.
the aforementioned modifications, we use the three image-
forensics methods with their default settings.
Datasets. Regarding the publicly available datasets that
are commonly used in the literature for evaluating image-
forensics tools, we choose two on which the targeted image-
forensics methods perform well. Therefore, forming ad-
versarial perturbations for these spliced images is more
challenging. These are the Columbia [14] and DSO-1 [9]
datasets containing 180 and 100 spliced images, respec-
tively, along with manipulation masks. Comparing the two
datasets, we would like to highlight that the images of
Columbia contain larger, very perceptible spliced regions.
Note that we have excluded 5 of the 100 DSO-1 images
from our experiments as the dimensions of the spliced im-
ages and their corresponding masks differ. In addition to
Columbia and DSO-1, we also run experiments on the more
challenging NC161 dataset which was collected for the Me-
dia Forensics Challenge2. Compared to Columbia or DSO-
1, NC16 is a relatively large dataset containing 564 images
with a great variety regarding image sizes, sizes of manipu-
lated regions, acquired camera models, etc.
Attacks. We utilize the algorithm that we described in
Section 3. Based on small-scale experiments, we have cho-
sen step-size of 5 pixels (α = 5) and iterations to be limited
to 50. Limiting the number of iterations naturally requires
a larger step-size to be able to mimic the predefined target.
Furthermore, with a larger step-size, it is less likely that the
algorithm will get stuck in a local optima regarding the sur-
face of the Euclidean loss. While these settings might yield
sub-optimal results, we can limit the computational costs
1https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/
nimble-challenge-2017-evaluation
2https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/
media-forensics-challenge
LOCALIZATION METHOD NC16 SUBSET
(results on spliced images) F1 MCC AUC MAP
B
L
EXIF-SC 0.843 0.746 0.925 0.864
SpliceRadar 0.823 0.734 0.912 0.827
Noiseprint 0.837 0.754 0.868 0.799
W
B
A EXIF-SC 0.644 0.542 0.851 0.631
SpliceRadar 0.602 0.474 0.809 0.569
Noiseprint 0.721 0.635 0.822 0.669
T
R
A
EXIF-SC on SpliceRadar Ex. 0.739 0.670 0.904 0.733
EXIF-SC on Noiseprint Ex. 0.676 0.603 0.845 0.646
SpliceRadar on EXIF-SC Ex. 0.803 0.719 0.917 0.821
SpliceRadar on Noiseprint Ex. 0.729 0.646 0.859 0.705
Noiseprint on EXIF-SC Ex. 0.793 0.714 0.917 0.810
Noiseprint on SpliceRadar Ex. 0.764 0.678 0.898 0.760
All Authentic Attack 0.387 0.234 N/A N/A
Table 2: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS ON NC16-SUBSET.
This table shows performance measures on the subset of the NC16
dataset consisting of manipulated images for which EXIF-SC,
SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint yield F1 scores greater than or equal
to 0.6 (83 images). We show the baseline performances (BL), per-
formances of the targeted image-forensics tools under adversar-
ial white-box attacks (WBA), and the transferability (TRA) of the
formed adversarial perturbations. The last row (All Authentic At-
tack) presents the applicable measures for ideal attacks where each
pixel is declared authentic by the targeted image-forensics method.
and evaluate the effectiveness of a general attack. Note that
due to our definition of an authentic patch and the default
patch size of EXIF-SC (128×128 pixels), four images of
the NC16 dataset do not have a single authentic patch and,
therefore, cannot be attacked with our algorithm.
Evaluation metrics. To evaluate the adversarial ro-
bustness of the three targeted image-forensics methods, we
compute and compare four performance measures that are
commonly used in the literature [15, 11, 7] – F1 score, the
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC), the Mean Aver-
(a) Left to right: spliced image, ground-truth manipulation mask, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(b) Left to right: adversarial image formed on EXIF-SC, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(c) Left to right: adversarial image formed on SpliceRadar, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(d) Left to right: adversarial image formed on Noiseprint, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
Figure 2: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ON THE COLUMBIA DATASET. This figure presents the qualitative results of adversarial
white-box and black-box attacks compared to the baseline performance of EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint on a spliced image.
The visualized heatmaps are scaled; blue for lowest and red for highest values. Note that adversarial perturbations are depicted on a gray
background and magnified by a factor of 100 for better visualization.
age Precision (MAP), and the area under the Receiving Op-
erating Characteristic curve (ROC-AUC or AUC, in short)
– before and after the adversarial attack takes place. Note
that both F1 and MCC operate on binary decision maps,
while forgery localization tools typically provide a proba-
bility map as output, which is then converted into a binary
map using a threshold. Regarding the selection of the opti-
mal threshold value, which is utilized to distinguish genuine
and forged regions based upon the formed heatmap, we fol-
low the same procedure as described in [15, 11].
4.2. Results
The quantitative results of our experiments are summa-
rized in Table 1. To demonstrate the qualitative properties of
our approach, we show examples for the Columbia, DSO-
1, and NC16 datasets in Figures 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
As we will see, on the more challenging NC16 dataset
the tested image-forensics methods do poorly. Since at-
tacking an already struggling splice localization tool does
not have much space for making further damage, we also
present results on a subset containing the manipulated im-
ages for which EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint per-
form better regarding the localization of the manipulated
areas (F1≥0.6). The results for this subset consisting of 83
images of the NC16 dataset are presented in Table 2.
Baselines. As a starting point, we obtain the perfor-
mance measures for the three targeted image-forensics al-
gorithms on the forged images of the three datasets. We
can see in Table 1 that EXIF-SC outperforms SpliceRadar
and Noiseprint on the Columbia dataset but falls behind
them on the more challenging DSO-1 and NC16 datasets.
In Figures 2(a), 3(a), 4(a), we show the qualitative splice
localization performances of EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and
Noiseprint on spliced images of the Columbia, DSO-1, and
NC16 datasets, respectively. As we can see, the three
image-forensics methods can more or less successfully lo-
(a) Left to right: spliced image, ground-truth manipulation mask, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(b) Left to right: adversarial image formed on EXIF-SC, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(c) Left to right: adversarial image formed on SpliceRadar, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(d) Left to right: adversarial image formed on Noiseprint, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
Figure 3: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ON THE DSO-1 DATASET. This figure demonstrates the qualitative results of adversarial
white-box and black-box attacks compared to the baseline performance of EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint on a spliced image.
The visualized heatmaps are scaled; blue for lowest and red for highest values. Note that adversarial perturbations are depicted on a gray
background and magnified by a factor of 100 for better visualization.
calize the manipulated regions denoted by the manipulation
masks as the authentic and forged regions can be separated
on the computed heatmaps by applicable threshold values.
Note that EXIF-SC also produces some false positive splice
localization on the DSO-1 example shown in Figure 3(a).
White-box attacks. To put the results of our adver-
sarial white-box attacks on EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and
Noiseprint into perspective, we show the applicable perfor-
mance measures for an “ideal attack” in the last row of Ta-
ble 1 labeled as All Authentic Attack. In short, this ideal
attack occurs when each pixel – both authentic and manip-
ulated – of the manipulated image is declared as authentic
by the image-forensics tool. Note that this ideal attack does
not yield lower bounds regarding the performance measures
that we can achieve. Due to the fact that SpliceRadar and
Noiseprint utilize a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) with
two components, they always declare authentic and ma-
nipulated regions. Consequently, it is impossible to per-
form an ideal attack on these two image-forensics tools.
Compared to baselines, we can see in Table 1 that white-
box attacks greatly decrease the performance measures of
both EXIF-SC and SpliceRadar, and we can notice that
Noiseprint is more resilient, especially on the Columbia
dataset. The qualitative results depicted in Figures 2(b)-
(d), 3(b)-(d), and 4(b)-(d) (leftmost images) demonstrate
that the formed adversarial examples contain impercepti-
bly small perturbations that are capable of impeding the
targeted image-forensics methods. Considering the visual-
ized perturbations, we notice that those formed on EXIF-
SC are stronger than the others generated on SpliceRadar
and Noiseprint. Note that due to our algorithm mimicking
the target representation with each patch, the false positive
splice localizations via EXIF-SC for the DSO-1 example
are all declared as authentic regions for the adversarially
perturbed image shown in Figure 3(b) (third image). Over-
all, the qualitative results visually demonstrate that the ad-
(a) Left to right: spliced image, ground-truth manipulation mask, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(b) Left to right: adversarial image formed on EXIF-SC, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(c) Left to right: adversarial image formed on SpliceRadar, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
(d) Left to right: adversarial image formed on Noiseprint, visualized adversarial perturbation, heatmaps via EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint
Figure 4: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ON THE NC16 DATASET. This figure demonstrates the qualitative results of adversarial
white-box and black-box attacks compared to the baseline performance of EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint on a spliced image.
The visualized heatmaps are scaled; blue for lowest and red for highest values. Note that adversarial perturbations are depicted on a gray
background and magnified by a factor of 100 for better visualization.
versarial white-box attacks have succeeded as authentic and
manipulated regions cannot be separated anymore via the
targeted splice localization tools.
Transferability of adversarial examples. Using the ad-
versarial examples that we have generated via white-box
attacks, we can also perform adversarial black-box attacks
by simply evaluating those examples on the other image-
forensics tools. This way we can assess the transferability
of the formed adversarial perturbations and study the feasi-
bility of such black-box attacks against EXIF-SC, SpliceR-
adar, and Noiseprint. Note that the vulnerability to black-
box attacks is more concerning from a security perspec-
tive as adversaries can impede their targeted system without
having direct access to it. The results in Table 1 highlight
an asymmetric behavior; we can see that while adversarial
perturbations formed on EXIF-SC cause a significant de-
terioration in the localization performance of SpliceRadar,
perturbations generated on SpliceRadar barely make a dif-
ference on EXIF-SC compared to its baseline performance.
While EXIF-SC appears to be less susceptible to examples
formed by adversarial white-box attacks on other image-
forensics methods, the forgery localization performance of
Noiseprint noticeably deteriorates under such black-box at-
tacks. Interestingly, considering the results on the Columbia
dataset we find that black-box attacks are slightly more suc-
cessful on Noiseprint than the white-box attacks. Regard-
ing qualitative results, we can see in Figures 2(b) and 3(b)
that the adversarial perturbations formed on EXIF-SC limit
the splice localization capabilities of SpliceRadar. While
the other adversarially perturbed Columbia, DSO-1, and
NC16 images shown in Figures 2-4 are not fully transfer-
able to other image-forensics tools, some yield predictions
of smaller manipulated regions, e.g., Noiseprint for the ad-
versarial examples formed on EXIF-SC and SpliceRadar
presented in Figure 2(b)-(c) (rightmost images).
5. Discussion
As we have seen, adversarial white-box attacks can
generally be considered successful on both EXIF-SC and
LOCALIZATION METHOD COLUMBIA DSO-1 NC16
(results on perturbed images) l0 l2 l∞ l0 l2 l∞ l0 l2 l∞
EXIF-SC 1109644.39 1877.47 19.86 5263130.16 3318.37 18.16 9012808.50 3592.89 15.05
SpliceRadar 568532.84 981.04 12.06 1828703.85 1625.76 9.98 3195024.54 1606.36 9.07
Noiseprint 681162.14 1338.88 22.40 1762103.27 1554.88 24.88 3464998.91 1599.90 15.50
Table 3: PERTURBATION METRICS. This table shows the means for various norms of the adversarial perturbations that we obtained
while attacking EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint using the manipulated images of the Columbia, DSO-1, and NC16 datasets.
SpliceRadar. However, the results of the white-box attacks
on Noiseprint and the asymmetric transferability of adver-
sarial examples require further analysis.
5.1. On the robustness of Noiseprint
Compared to EXIF-SC and SpliceRadar, the results in-
dicate that Noiseprint is more resilient to our adversarial
white-box attack, especially on the Columbia dataset. To
make sure that the higher resistance is not due to our choice
of mimicking a target defined as the mean representation
of authentic patches, we have conducted image-based ad-
versarial white-box attacks on the Columbia dataset that
also contains authentic counterparts of the spliced images.
Namely, instead of manipulating patches in order to move
their representations closer to the predefined target, for each
spliced image we have identified their authentic counter-
part, extracted the feature representation from that image,
and used it as our target to mimic with the feature represen-
tation extracted from the whole corresponding spliced im-
age. Overall, this image-based white-box attack has failed
to outperform our patch-based approach.
We conjecture that the higher robustness of Noiseprint
compared to EXIF-SC and SpliceRadar is due to the higher
dimensional features extracted from manipulated images
and the lack of bottlenecks in the network architecture used
for feature extraction. Both bottlenecks and lower dimen-
sional features yield possible collisions – patches or images
having the same extracted feature representations – which
can be exploited by adversaries. While both EXIF-SC and
SpliceRadar work with feature representations of lower di-
mensionalities – with default settings, 72×72-pixel patches
projected into 100-dimensional and 128×128-pixel patches
mapped into 4096-dimensional feature representations, re-
spectively – Noiseprint yields 2-D noise residual maps with
height and width identical to its inputs.
5.2. Asymmetric transferability
To understand the asymmetric transferability properties
of adversarial examples, especially between EXIF-SC and
SpliceRadar, we have analyzed the perturbations that we
formed on the three targeted image-forensics algorithms.
The quantitative results are summarized in Table 3. We
can see that the adversarial perturbations formed by our ap-
proach while attacking EXIF-SC are stronger than those ob-
tained on SpliceRadar or Noiseprint. Adversarial attacks on
EXIF-SC affect the most pixels, as indicated by l0 norms,
and they lead to the highest Euclidean norms as well.
Assuming that stronger perturbations yield higher trans-
ferability rates is a reasonable hypothesis. To validate that,
we have formed new examples by scaling the formed per-
turbations; we have doubled the perturbations of examples
that we obtained on SpliceRadar and halved those we gener-
ated while attacking EXIF-SC. After evaluating these new
examples, we have found that the transferability of adver-
sarial examples is not strictly determined by the strength of
perturbations in terms of l0, l2, or l∞ norms. Considering
the results on the subset of NC16 in Table 2, we can see
on both SpliceRadar and Noiseprint that stronger perturba-
tions formed on EXIF-SC cause lower deterioration on the
splice localization performance than weaker perturbations
generated on the other two image-forensics methods.
6. Conclusion
Image forensics can play an important role to prevent
the spread of manipulated content on communication chan-
nels, such as digital and social media. The detection and/or
localization of manipulated regions on forged images have
already attracted the research community, and this research
area will likely gain more focus in the future thanks to the
increasing demand for such tools. Due to recent advances
and trends in machine learning, researchers have proposed
deep learning-based image-forensics methods that perform
well regarding the localization of various manipulations, in-
cluding splices. However, the applied deep learning models
are inherently susceptible to adversarial perturbations mak-
ing such tools vulnerable as well.
In this paper, we have demonstrated on three image-
forensics methods, EXIF-SC, SpliceRadar, and Noiseprint,
that splice localization via non end-to-end deep learning-
based approaches can be impeded by directly manipulat-
ing the internal representations of image patches. Further-
more, we have found that adversarial perturbations can be
transferable among the tested image-forensics methods to
decrease their capabilities with different effectiveness.
In summary, deep learning-based image-forensics meth-
ods that were designed to reveal manipulations, ironically,
can be impeded by the application of additional manipula-
tions. To avoid this problem, we need deep learning models
that are inherently robust to adversarial perturbations.
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